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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
LP Broadband, Inc.("Defendant") is the successor by merger to MicroServ Computer 
Technologies, Inc. ("MicroServ"). As such, Defendant is entitled to all defenses, rights and 
obligations ofMicorServ. 
Lincoln Land Company, ("Plaintiff') brought this action claiming Defendant was 
unjustly emiched in the use of rooftop space on property Plaintiff purchased. On March 20, 
2000, MicroServ entered into an agreement with General Mills ("GM") for the use of a grain 
elevator rooftop for a location for antenna equipment. This agreement was for the Evans 
Grainery location owned, operated or in use by GM. This agreement allowed for MicroServ to 
install and utilize equipment on the property for the payment of $50.00 per month. The 
agreement requires that any party seeking to tenninate the agreement must give a 90 day notice 
before termination. Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Adam Gillings R. pp. 75-76. 
MicroServ installed equipment at this location and utilized the equipment until April, 
2014. Pursuant to the rental agreement, MicroServ and then Defendant paid the monthly rent 
pursuant to the agreement with GM for each month beginning March, 2000 until April, 2014. 
Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Adam Gillings R. pp. 77-88. No termination of the agreement was 
made by Defendant nor GM at any time. 
In approximately June, 2010, Plaintiff purchased the property where the rooftop space 
was being utilized. Defendant and MicroServ did not have any notice or lmowledge of any 
change of ownership of the property by Plaintiff until April, 2014 when Plaintiff sent a letter to 
Defendant. There was no notification or signage on the property to indicate any ownership 
change to Plaintiff. Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Adam Gillings R. pp. 89-95. 
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At all times from March, 2000 until April, 2014, GM operated as ifit had all authority to 
rent the property to Defendant. GM allowed access to the property and collected the rent 
payments from Defendant. 
On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant claiming Defendant was unjustly 
emiched by Plaintiff. The sole claim indicated the unjust emichment was the result of the use of 
the rooftop space by Defendant. 
Plaintiff filed for partial summary judgment and Defendant filed for summary judgment. 
Both motions were heard by the District Court on April 13, 2016. The District Court entered a 
Memorandum Decision and Order on May 18, 2016 granting Defendant's summary judgment 
motion. Judgment was entered on August 19, 2016. Defendant requested attorney fees and costs 
on September 2, 2016. The District Comi denied the request for attorney fees on October 5, 
2016. 
Appeal was timely taken by Plaintiff on the judgment granting summary judgment and by 
Defendant on the denial of attorney fees. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. The District Court erred in granting Sunnnary Judgment to LP Broadband by determining 
that no benefit was conferred to LP Broadband by Lincoln Land Company. 
II. The District Court erred in determining that the standard to establish a claim for unjust 
emichment requires that the benefit conferred upon the party unjustly enriched must 
be provided directly by the paiiy seeking to recover. 
III. The District Court erred in denying LP Broadband's request for attorney fees. (Cross-
Appeal Issue) 
IV. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs hereby request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 
and 12-121; Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54; Appellate Rules 40 and 41; and, all other 
applicable mies and statutes .. On appeal Idaho Code § 12-120(3) compels an award attorney 
fees to the prevailing paiiy in any civil action involving a commercial transaction. A conunercial 
transaction is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
pmposes." LC.§ 12-120(3). In this case, the alleged interaction between the Plaintiff and 




Standard of Review 
On review of a summary judgment order, this Court employs the same standard used 
below. Wyman v. Eck, 161 Idaho 723, 390 Idaho 449 (2017) Summary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." IR.C.P. 56(c). When assessing a motion for summary judgment, 
all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, 
the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & 
M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna 
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). 
The party moving for summaty judgment initially carries the burden to establish that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). The burden may 
be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be 
required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 
(Ct.App.1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing 
with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and 
tl1e contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 
Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been 
established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further 
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to 
offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under LR.C.P. 56(f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874, 
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876 P.2d at 156. 
The moving party is entitled to summaiy judgment when the nonmoving paiiy fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that paiiy's case 
on which the paiiy will hem the burden of proof at trial. Brewer v. Washington RSA No.8 Ltd 
Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 739, 184 P.3d 860, 864 (2008). 
I. The District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to LP Broadband by 
determining that no benefit was conferred to LP Broadband by Lincoln Land Company. 
Plaintiffs initial issue on appeal seeks to invalidate the District Cami's decision that 
"Lincoln Land did not, as a matter of law, confer a benefit on LP Broadband." Memorandum 
Decision and Order, R. p. 375. 
A prima facie case for unjust enrichment exists where: "(l) there was a benefit conferred 
upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) 
acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to 
retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Stevenson v. 
Windermere Real Estate/Capital Grp., Inc., 152 Idaho 824,827,275 P.3d 839, 842 (2012) "A 
person confers a benefit upon another ifhe or she gives the other some interest in money, land, 
or possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of 
the other, or in any way adds to the other's advantage." 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts §9 (2013) 
In this matter, it is undisputed that the only alleged benefit Defendant obtained was the 
access to and use of the rooftop space. The District Comi correctly concluded that this alleged 
benefit was not given by the Plaintiff, but by GM who occupied the property. It was GM that 
entered into a rental agreement with Defendant, allowed access to the property and collected the 
rent for the use. Defendant had been on the property based on this agreement for 10 years prior 
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to the Plaintiff even purchasing the property. Plaintiff did not confer anything to the Defendant. 
By its own admission, Plaintiff did not even !mow of the existence of Defendant on the property 
until January, 2015. Complaint para. 5 R. p. 17. 
The requirement of the Plaintiff to actually confer a benefit on the Defendant has a long 
history in Idaho case law. This Comt most recently discussed this matter in the case of Medical 
Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 336 P.3d 802 
(2014). Within the analysis of this case, this Court thoroughly reviewed the relevant case law 
which flows through Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 797 P.2d 
863 (1990) and Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital Group, Inc., 152 Idaho 824,275 
P.3d 839 (2012). Each of these cases and the internally cited cases therein all supp01t this Court's 
statement that the Plaintiff in an unjust emichment case must confer an actual benefit to the 
Defendant to satisfy the first requirement in an unjust emichment claim. Medical Recovery 
Services, LLC at 399. 
The Plaintiff seeks to reduce this Court's analysis in Medical Recovery Services to apply 
to only money and not the requirement that a Plaintiff must confer an actual benefit. This Comt 
in Medical Recovery Services did not limit its findings to personal propeity, but rather 
consistently referenced the full spectrum of money, land, possessions, or services as noted in the 
C.J.S. 
In Medical Recovery Services, a judgment and execution documents were obtained by 
Medical Recovery Services against a debtor. Medical Recovery Services then undertook efforts 
to have wages garnished from the employer of debtor. The garnishment was mistakenly sent 
from the employer to another collection company, Bonneville Billing and Collections, which 
also had outstanding amounts owed by the same debtor. Medical Recovery Services sought to 
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obtain the funds from Bonneville Billing and Collections, but was unsuccessful. Medical 
Recovery Services then filed suit against Bonneville Billing and Collections for unjust 
emichment. 
On appeal, this Court overturned the District Court's determination that Medical 
Recovery Services was entitled to relief based on unjust emichment. In the analysis of the case, 
this Court noted that Medical Recovery Services did not confer any direct benefit on Bonneville 
Billings and Collections. Id at 399, 806. The Court held that Medical Recovery Services did 
nothing to directly benefit or at the request of Bonneville Billing and Collections. The Cami 
noted that Medical Recovery Services did nothing for the direct benefit of anyone else. Id. 
Plaintiff has also argued that GM had no legal basis to confer any benefit on Defendant 
and therefore any benefit to Defendant must have come from Plaintiff. This assertion is also 
inc01rect. This Court addressed this issue in the case of Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Limited 
Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008). In Brewer, this Court addressed the leasing of 
a property owned by multiple tenants to Inland Cellular. Id This Comi noted that co-tenants had 
no power or right to lease a portion of the property to the exclusion of the other co-tenants 
without approval of all tenants. Id at 738. While these facts and legal standing had importance to 
other legal issues in the case, they had no significance to the Comi' s analysis of the unjust 
enrichment. 
In evaluating the unjust enrichment claim, this Court made no references to the legal 
basis for Inland Cellular's occupancy of the prope1iy. The analysis turned only on the issues of 
the use of the property as a benefit and evidence presented in opposition to summary judgment. 
As the legality of the permission given was not an issue in Brewer the same is true for this 
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matter. The elements for unjust emichment examine who provided a benefit, not if there was a 
legal basis for that benefit. 
The District Court also relied upon the analysis of the Brewer case to determine if a 
benefit was conferred. This Court's analysis of Brewer for the purpose of a benefit being 
conferred noted that the property was being occupied by Inland Cellulm. Id The reading of the 
decision on Brewer shows that this occupancy of the property, by itself, was not sufficient to 
show a benefit conferred by the Plaintiffs. Id at 739. It is important to note that in Brewer,just 
as in this case, plaintiffs did not know of Inland Cellulm' s use of the land, and the use was 
ongoing at the time the plaintiffs acquired their interests. All of these factors show that the 
occupancy of the property was not sufficient, standing alone, to show a benefit conferred from 
plaintiffs to Inland Cellular. 
The facts of Brewer and this matter me very similm. Plaintiff in this matter acquired this 
property during the time that Defendant was occupying the rooftop pursuant to the agreement 
with GM. Plaintiff did not know of Defendant's use during this time. Plaintiff has only asserted 
that the use of the property was the alleged benefit. Just as in Brewer, this use nnder these 
circumstances is not sufficient to meet the pr:ima facie elements for nnjust emichment, benefit or 
any cause of action. 
The District Court's granting summary judgment based on no benefit given from the 
Plaintiff to Defendant was proper. There were no material facts in dispute as to the occupancy of 





II. The District Court erred in determining that the standard to establish a claim for 
unjust enrichment requires that the benefit conferred upon the party unjustly enriched 
must be provided directly by the party seeking to recover. 
Plaintiff finally argues that the District Court e!1'ed in finding there must be a direct 
benefit provided from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The District Court primarily relied upon the 
Medical Recovery Services case and the analysis therein for its support of this finding. 
As discussed above, the legal history of confel1'ing an actual benefit by the Plaintiff is 
well established in Idaho. In Medical Recovery Services, this Court noted that "to confer a 
benefit in the context of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must give the defendant an interest in 
money, land, or possessions, or perform services beneficial to, or at the request of, the other." 
Medical Recovery Services at 399 ( emphasis added). This Court further stated, 
The benefit enjoyed by BBC in this case, funds from three checks 
totaling $1,083.21, was confe!1'ed on BBC by WSEC because 
WSEC sent the checks. In this respect, MRS' argument is very 
similar to the plaintiff's argument in Beco, who argued it could 
recover on an unjust enrichment theory for a benefit it did not 
directly confer. It is also similar to the plaintiffs' argument in 
Stevenson that Windermere's benefit resulted from a benefit they 
conferred on Jefferson. We rejected both those arguments. 
Likewise, we reject MRS' argument in this case. Id. 
This Court in Stevenson specifically addressed the type of maneuvering Plaintiff seeks to employ 
in this matter. The Court stated, "The Stevensons' argument, reduced to its essence, is that 
because they conferred a benefit upon Jefferson, and Jefferson confe!1'ed a benefit upon 
Windermere, they can cut out the middleman and directly recover from Windennere for unjust 
enrichment." Stevenson at 827. This Comt rejected this type ofrecovery in unjust enrichment 
cases, stating there must be a direct benefit. 
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In each of the above cases, this Court has required that the benefit in an unjust 
enrichment case be given directly by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. In Medical Recovery 
Services, the benefit, a check, was given by a third paiiy, WSEC, to the Defendant, BBC. 
Medical Recovery Services at 3 99. In Stevenson, the benefit, a commission check, was given by a 
third paiiy, Winde1mere, to the Defendant, Jefferson. Stevenson at 829. In Beco, the benefit, a 
contract awmd, was given by a third party, M-K, to the Defendant Bannock Paving Company. 
Beco at 867. In each of these cases, this CoUii held that where the benefit did not directly come 
from the Plaintiff and go directly to the Defendant, there is no unjust enrichment. In this case, the 
benefit, access to the property and use of the rooftop space was given by a third-party, GM, to 
the Defendant. 
The Beco case provides additional insight to the requirements of the direct benefit. In 
Beco, plaintiff made the mgument that "the equitable principle of unjust enrichment does not 
require the plaintiff and the defendant to have any other relationship beyond the nexus that one 
party may not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the other." Id. This Court rejected this 
argument, noting that all cited cases by Beco involved pmties who actually had a contractual 
relationship or a claim to real property which were the underlying reasons for the unjust 
enrichment claims. Id. It was this connection between the parties that allowed the unjust 
enrichment claim to stand. 
Plaintiff inappropriately relies upon the case of Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, l 09 Idaho 
737, 710 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1985) for the proposition that Idaho law does not require a direct 
link between the plaintiffs benefit and defendant. Plaintiffs cited quote from the Idaho Lumber 
case is not a statement of the Court, but a reference to 66 Am.Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied 
Contracts §3(1973). This statement in its entirety states, 
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The phrase "unjust emichment" is used in law to characterize the 
result or effect of a failure to make restitution of, or for, property 
or benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a 
legal or equitable obligation to account therefor. It is a general 
principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, that one 
person should not be permitted unjustly to emich himself at the 
expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or 
for propeity or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where 
it is just and equitable that such restitution be made, and where 
such action involves no violation or frustration of law or 
opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly. 
Thus, Idaho has not adopted this statement into its case law but merely referenced the section. 
The facts and holdings of Idaho Lumber support the finding of s requirement of direct 
benefit as well. Iu Idaho Lumber, Idaho Lumber furnished materials and labor pursuant to a 
contract with Walker for renovations of a building. Walker was not the property owner, but had 
leased the property from Buck. Walker defaulted on the contract and Idaho Lumber brought suit 
for the outstanding amount owed for work on the property. Walker :filed for and was granted a 
bar1kruptcy on the amount owed to Idaho Lumber. Idaho Lumber sought damages against Buck 
for unjust emichment. Idaho Lumber supra. 
The court held that the unjust emichment action was proper as there was a connection 
between Idaho Lumber and Buck. This connection was the property Idaho Lumber had supplied 
materials and services to improve was Buck's prope1ty. Idaho Lumber had directly provided a 
benefit to Buck in increasing the value of his property. Id. 
The Idaho Lumber case does not support a finding that there does not have to be a 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in an unjust emichment, but just the opposite. 
There must be some direct link between the plaintiff and defendant and the benefit given in order 
to support a claim for unjust emichment. 
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Plaintiff on appeal continues to ignore the actions of GM and the role GM played in this 
matter. Specifically Plaintiff states, "it is not material ... if General Mills is the actual 
wrongdoer." If the holdings of Idaho Lumber are to be completely applied, Plaintiff was 
obligated to seek any damages from GM before seeking them against Defendant, and Defendant 
was not unjustly enriched by its payments to GM. In Idaho Lumber, the Court of Appeals 
adopted the language and rule from the Tennessee case of Paschall's Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Tenn. 
45, 407 S.W.2d 150 (1966), The rule stated, 
The most significant requirement for a recovery on quasi contract 
is that the enrichment to the defendant be unjust. Consequently, if 
the landowner has given any consideration to any person for the 
improvements, it would not be unjust for him to retain the benefit 
without paying the furnisher. Also, we think that before recovery 
can be had against the landowner on an unjust enrichment theory, 
the furnisher of the materials and labor must have exhausted his 
remedies against the person with whom he had contracted, and still 
has not received the reasonable value of his services. 
As Plaintiff has not sought recovery for the errors of GM and it is undisputed that Defendant has 
given consideration to GM for the use of the property, there could be no unjust enrichment claim 
prosecuted by the Plaintiff in this matter pursuant to the rule adopted in Idaho Lumber. 
The District Court did not error in finding Plaintiff was required to provide a direct 
benefit to the Defendant. Sununary judgment was proper. 
III. The District Court erred in denying LP Broadband's request for attorney fees. 
l.C.§12-121(3) 
The awarding of attorney fees under LC. 12-120(3) is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 711, 52 P.3d 848, 856 (2002). To 
prove an abuse of discretion this Court looks to three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of 
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its discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; 
and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.Id. However, 
whether a statute awarding attorney fees applies to a given set of facts is a question of law and 
subject to free review. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641,644, 152 P.3d 2, 5 
(2006). "Whether a district comt has correctly determined that a case is based on a 'commercial 
transaction' for the purpose ofI.C. § 12-120(3) is a question oflaw. This Court exercises free 
review over questions oflaw." Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Const., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 173, 158 
P.3d 947, 949 (2007). 
A commercial transaction is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal 
or household purposes." LC. § 12-120(3). This plain language requires the interaction in this 
matter to be determined a commercial transaction. None of the parties in this matter are 
individuals and therefore none of the interaction can be personal. Additionally, this matter did 
not involve a claim related to household purposes. Black's Law Dictionary (lO'h ed. 2014) 
defines transaction as "any activity involving two or more persons." 
In this matter, Plaintiff alleged an activity involving itself and Defendant. Plaintiff 
claimed that this activity was sufficient to produce a contract implied in law. This claim is 
sufficient to satisfy the clear definition of a commercial transaction between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
The fact that this connection was adjudicated to not have occurred should not be 
construed to defeat a claim for attorney fees based on a commercial transaction. Should the 
Plaintiff prevailed, it could then claim that as a result of the action a commercial transaction had 





commercial transaction. The ability to recover under a statute should not be beneficial to only 
one party no matter the outcome of that party's case. 
I.C.§12-121 and I.R.C.P 54(e)(2) 
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 is not a matter ofrightto the 
prevailing pmty, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding 
belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without 
foundation. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). When deciding 
whether attorney fees should be awarded under LC.§ 12-121, the entire course of the litigation 
must be taken into account and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees 
may not be awarded even though the losing party has asse1ted other factual or legal claims that 
are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Id. 
The District Court e1Ted in determining that this matter was not brought and defended 
frivolously. The District Court relied on the fact that, "General Mills clearly did not have the 
authority to sublease the rooftop space to LP Broadband;" and "Lincoln Land provided evidence 
that the sub-lease's value was below market." Memorandum Decision R. p. 438. These findings, 
however, do not produce a finding that the case was legitimate. 
The required analysis is that there must be one legitimate issue. In this matter, only one 
issue was presented, unjust enrichment. While this issue has several parts, a legitimate issue must 
be found, not a part of that issue. 
Plaintiffs allegation of unjust enrichment is frivolous, despite the apparent claim of at 
least one legitimate question of one part. Frivolous conduct is defined as actions and claims that 
are not suppmted by the facts or in law. In this matter, Plaintiff sought over one-hundred 
thousand dollars from Defendant without any basis in law or in fact. In the Memorandum 
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Decision and Order the District Court noted that two Idaho Supreme Court cases were directly 
on point in this matter. Both cases showed that a necessary element of the claim of unjust 
emichment was that the Plaintiff confer a benefit on the Defendant. In this matter, Plaintifflmew 
it did not confer any benefit on the Defendant. In Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiff aclmowledged 
that Defendant was operating on the property pursuant to an agreement with the third-party, GM. 
Plaintiff lmew that GM was allowing Defendant to access the property and was collecting rent 
for the Defendant's use of the property. There was no benefit given to the Defendant by the 
Plaintiff what so ever. The complete lack of any factual suppmt for this initial part of the analysis 
for unjust emichment makes the Plaintiffs case frivolous. 
In the Stevenson case, the district court found and this Comt upheld the decision that the 
Defendant was entitled to attorney fees as the case was brought and/or defended frivolously. 
Stevenson at 830. In Stevenson, exactly as in this matter, the Plaintiffs claim was dismissed as 
there was no benefit given from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. Id. The fact that there was no 
evidence presented of a direct benefit provided from the Plaintiff to the Defendant made the 
unjust emichment claim meritless. Id. 
If there is no factual basis or argument to meet one of the required elements for a cause of 
action, any suit on that cause of action is frivolous. The argument that on the other two elements 
there was a potential factual basis is insufficient to legitimize the claim. 
In this matter, Plaintiffs knowledge of the actions of GM and the lack of a benefit it 







The allegations of the Plaintiff on appeal are not suppmied by long standing case law in 
Idaho. The dete1minations by the District Court in granting sunnnary judgment are conect and 
sunnna:ry judgment was properly granted. Attorney fees both below and on appeal should be 
granted as this matter meets the clear and unambiguous language ofI.C.§ 12-121(3) and this 
matter has been brought and defended frivolously pursuant to I.C.§ 12-121. 
. ,, ,Jft-
DATED this 4 day of May, 2017. 
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Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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